Uphill Self-Control by Jawwad Noor & Norio Takeoka
Uphill Self-Control¤
Jawwad Noor Norio Takeoka
August 8, 2009
Abstract
This paper is motivated by the idea that self-control is more diﬃcult to exert
the more it is exerted. We extend the theory of temptation and self-control intro-
duced by Gul and Pesendorfer [8] to allow for an increasing marginal cost of resisting
temptation, that is, convex self-control costs. We also prove a general representa-
tion theorem that admits a general class of self-control cost functions. Both models
maintain Gul and Pesendorfer’s Order, Continuity and Set-Betweenness axioms but
violate Independence.
1 Introduction
Gul and Pesendorfer [8] (henceforth GP) introduce a theory of choice under temptation.
They model an agent who experiences temptation at the moment of choice, and anticipates
this in an ex-ante period where he selects what choice problem to face. In this ex-ante
period he has a particular perspective on what he should choose, embodied in a ‘normative
preference’. He understands that his choice from menus will not necessarily respect nor-
mative preference, but rather will seek to balance his normative preference with the cost
of resisting temptation.
GP axiomatize the following model (1)-(2). Denote the space of alternatives (lotteries)
by ∆ and the space of menus (nonempty subsets of ∆) by Z. The primitive is a preference %
over menus Z, and reﬂects the ex-ante choice between menus prior to ex-post (unmodelled)
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1choice from a menu. The general class of models that captures an abstract version of the
story in GP is reﬂected in the following representation for %:
W(x) = max
µ2x
fu(µ) ¡ c(µ,x)g, x 2 Z, (1)
where u : ∆ ! R represents a vNM normative preference and c(µ,x) reﬂects the self-control
cost of choosing µ from the menu x. The representation suggests that the utility of a menu
is its indirect utility: the maximum of normative utility less self-control costs. GP’s model
is a specialization that tells a very speciﬁc story about the self-control cost function c. Their
model identiﬁes a vNM function v : ∆ ! R that represents the temptation perspective, and
measures self-control costs c in terms of the diﬀerence between the maximum temptation
utility achievable in a menu x and the actual temptation utility achieved by a choice µ 2 x:
c(µ,x) = max
η2x v(η) ¡ v(µ). (2)
That is, the self-control cost of choosing µ from x is identiﬁed with the corresponding
degree of ‘frustration’ of the temptation perspective.
A peculiar feature of GP’s cost function is its linearity in the degree to which temptation
preferences are frustrated, that is, in maxη2x v(η) ¡ v(µ). Intuitively, the agent has a
constant marginal cost of exerting self-control. This paper is based on the idea that the
marginal cost may not be constant. Introspection suggests that the exertion of self-control
involves an uphill battle: the marginal cost appears to increase with the exertion of self-
control. This is supported by research in psychology that demonstrates that self-control
is a limited resource.1 Motivated by the idea of uphill self-control, this paper axiomatizes
two models.







, x 2 Z,
where u and v are linear and c satisﬁes some minimal regularity properties that support its
interpretation as the cost of self-control. This expunges from GP’s model all but the basic
linearity required for the existence of linear normative and temptation utilities, without
departing from the basic qualitative story underlying GP’s model. Thus, the agent max-
imizes normative utility net of self-control costs, and the cost c(µ,¢) is increasing for any
given possible choice µ.








η2x v(η) ¡ v(µ)
¶¾
, x 2 Z, (3)
1This is noted by Fudenberg and Levine [6, 7]; see their paper for references.
2for some increasing function ϕ : R+ ! R+ that is convex on the part of the domain that
‘matters for behavior’. This model enriches the general model by requiring self-control
costs to depend on the degree of frustration of temptation preference, as in the GP model,
but without forcing this dependence to be linear.
The convex self-control model behaviorally diﬀers from the GP model in signiﬁcant
ways. As expressed by one of our axioms, a peculiar feature of convex self-control is that
randomization never makes it harder to exert self-control. For instance, if an agent can
choose a risky lottery r despite being tempted by a safe lottery s, then he can also choose
the risky lottery when both are mixed with a common third lottery, that is, he can choose
αr + (1 ¡ α)ν over αs + (1 ¡ α)ν even if the latter is tempting. Intuitively, randomization
reduces the diﬀerence in temptation utility between the alternatives which in turn reduces
the marginal cost of exerting self-control, thereby enhancing self-control. Notably, this
feature generates the Allais paradox: an agent who may choose s over r may also choose
αr + (1 ¡ α)ν over αs + (1 ¡ α)ν. Overlapping with our companion paper (Noor and
Takeoka [14]) is also the behavioral implication that convex self-control costs will typically
cause ex-post choice to violate the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference: an agent may
resist temptation and choose αr +(1¡α)ν over αs+(1¡α)ν in a direct comparison, but
when the more tempting option s is available, the increased marginal cost of self-control
may make αs + (1 ¡ α)ν an attractive compromise.
Further motivation for studying the foundations of the convex self-control can be de-
rived from Fudenberg and Levine [6, 7]. These authors study a (non-axiomatic) dual-self
model that features convex self-control costs. While independently making some of the
above observations, they also show that their model can explain a wide range of behavioral
anomalies, such the Allais paradox, Rabin’s paradox, intertemporal preference reversals, the
relationship between time and risk preferences observed in experiments, and the relation-
ship between cognitive load and risk preferences. They also show that plausible parameter
values allow them to quantitatively ﬁt their model to data on a range of behaviors.
To oﬀer some additional perspective on our paper, we point out where it stands relative
to the current development of the axiomatic literature on temptation. GP’s axiomati-
zation of their model makes use of four axioms: Order, Continuity, Independence and
Set-Betweenness. The ﬁrst three are natural extensions of the von Neumann-Morgenstern
axioms to a sets of lotteries setting, and the fourth expresses the agent’s temptation and
anticipated choice from menus. Of the four axioms, Set-Betweenness is clearly a substantive
axiom for a model of decision under temptation. Indeed, existing generalizations of GP’s
model (Chatterjee and Krishna [3], Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini [4], Stoval [17]) have
focused on relaxing Set-Betweenness while maintaining Independence. This paper (and
the companion paper [14]) seeks to understand what is potentially lost if one maintains
Independence, a convenient and standard axiom in the literature that seems less important
than Set-Betweenness from the point of view of decision under temptation. We show that
the axiom is not auxiliary in nature in that it rules out intuitive qualitative stories about
decision under temptation, even if Set-Betweenness is retained. In fact, both the models
axiomatized in this paper satisfy Set-Betweenness.
3The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. This Introduction concludes with a
mention of related literature. Sections 2 and 3 axiomatize our general and convex models
respectively. Section 4 concludes with some observations of the convex model’s implied
properties for ex post choice. All proofs are contained in appendices.
1.1 Related Literature
In a game-theoretic setting, Fudenberg and Levine [6, 7] study the interaction of a long-run
patient self and a sequence of short-run impulsive selves, each of which is a primitive of
their model. They show that the equilibria of the game played by those selves can be
regarded as the solution to a maximization problem analogous to (1). Their general setup
allows for cases where the cost function might be convex, which would then correspond to
specializations of (1) which include the convex self-control model. In [7] they construct and
analyze a model with convex self-control costs that explains and quantitatively ﬁts a range
of experimental ﬁndings.
In the temptation literature, Chatterjee and Krishna [3], Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini
[4] and Stoval [17] generalize GP’s model. They model agents who are uncertain about
temptation (e.g. uncertain about the temptation preference itself, or uncertainty regarding
the strength of self-control, etc.), and Dekel et al also axiomatize a model where multiple
temptations are experienced by the agent. These models relax Set-Betweenness but main-
tain Independence. This paper explores an alternative direction where Set-Betweenness is
maintained and Independence relaxed. We interpret violations of Independence in terms
of non-linear self-control costs. In a companion paper (Noor and Takeoka [14]), we fo-
cus on another possible source of violations of Independence, speciﬁcally the possibility of
menu-dependent self-control.
Nehring [12] is interested in a more careful description of the notion of self-control,
which he interprets in terms of a preference over preferences (second order preferences).
Olszewski [15] relaxes the single-dimensionality of temptation in GP’s model by permit-
ting diﬀerent alternatives in a menu to be tempted by diﬀerent alternatives in the menu.
Though not speciﬁcally motivated by the idea of uphill self-control, these authors provide
foundations for functional forms that can accommodate uphill self-control. On a techni-
cal level these papers diﬀer substantially from ours in that they focus on discrete settings
whereas we provide an axiomatic generalization of GP’s model in a sets-of-lotteries setting.
Finally, we mention Gul and Pesendorfer [10] who, also in a discrete setting, axiomatize




which admits the interpretation that the agent is tempted to maximize some temptation
utility v but choice is determined by the maximization of some function w. The two
utilities are then aggregated by the function f. To compare, we note that our general




4Thus, while ex post choice in the Gul and Pesendorfer [10] model maximizes a utility w, in
our model ex post choice from x maximizes the menu-dependent utility f(µ,maxη2x v(η)).
Indeed, ex post choice in their model satisﬁes the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference, and
this in turn suggests that the model is not suitably interpreted as one involving non-linear
self-control.
2 General Model
For any compact metric space C, ∆(C) denotes the set of all probability measures on the
Borel σ-algebra of C, endowed with the weak convergence topology; ∆(C) is compact and
metrizable [1, Thm 14.11], and we often write it simply as ∆. Let Z = K(∆) denote the set
of all nonempty compact subsets of ∆. When endowed with the Hausdorﬀ topology, Z is a
compact metric space [1, Thm 3.71(3)]. An element x 2 Z is referred to as a menu. Generic
elements of Z are x,y,z whereas generic elements of ∆ are µ,η,ν. For α 2 [0,1], µαη 2 ∆
is the α-mixture that assigns αµ(A)+(1¡α)η(A) to each A in the Borel σ¡algebra of C.
Similarly, xαy ´ fµαη : µ 2 x,η 2 yg 2 Z is an α-mixture of menus x and y.
As in GP, the primitive is a preference % over Z.
2.1 Axioms
The ﬁrst three axioms are familiar from GP.
Axiom 1 (Order) % is complete and transitive.
Axiom 2 (Continuity) The sets fy 2 Z : y % xg and fy 2 Z : x % yg are closed for
each x 2 Z.
Axiom 3 (Set-Betweenness) For all x,y 2 Z,
x % y =) x % x [ y % y.
We refer the reader to GP for a more complete discussion of Set-Betweenness, which
involves interpreting the ranking of x and x[y as indicating whether there temptation lies
in y, and the ranking of x[y and y as indicating whether (unmodelled) ex post choice from
the menu x [ y lies in y. What needs to be noted for the purpose of this paper is that the
interpretation of Set-Betweenness does not hinge on any precise properties of how exertion
of self-control in the menu x[y aﬀects its desirability. This suggests that Set-Betweenness
is not inconsistent with generalizations of GP that relax the structure on self-control costs.
GP’s fourth axiom formulates the standard vNM independence axiom to the menus-
setting: for all x,y,z and α 2 (0,1),
x Â y =) xαz Â yαz.
We relax Independence so as to impose vNM structure on commitment preference and
temptation preference only.
5Axiom 4 (Commitment Independence) For any µ,η,ν and α 2 (0,1),
fµg Â fηg =) fµανg Â fηανg.
Axiom 5 (Temptation Independence) For any µ,η,ν and α 2 (0,1) s.t. fµg Â fηg,
fµg % fµ,ηg () fµανg % fµαν,ηανg.
Moreover, for any µ,η,η0 and α 2 (0,1) s.t. fµg Â fηg,fη0g,
fµg Â fµ,ηg and fµg Â fµ,η
0g =) fµg Â fµ,ηαη
0g
fµg » fµ,ηg and fµg » fµ,η
0g =) fµg » fµ,ηαη
0g.
Commitment Independence is readily interpreted. The ﬁrst part of Temptation Inde-
pendence states that η tempts (resp. does not tempt) µ if and only if ηαν tempts (resp.
does not tempt) µαν. The second part states that if η and η0 both tempt (resp. do not
tempt) µ, then the mixture ηαη0 tempts (resp. does not tempt) µ. These are properties
that would be expected from a vNM temptation preference.
To introduce the next axiom, consider some rankings of menus that are presumably
associated with temptation preference. Say that η is at least as tempting as µ if either
fµg Â fµ,ηg or fηg » fµ,ηg Â fµg holds. As in the previous axiom, the ﬁrst condition is
a typical behavior revealing that η is more tempting than µ. The second condition says that
η is normatively superior to µ, and the agent does not exhibit preference for commitment
to η. This preference pattern reveals that µ is not more tempting than η, in other words,
η is at least as tempting as µ.
The key axiom we adopt for our general model is:
Axiom 6 (Temptation Dependence) If fµg Â fµ,ηg Â fηg for some µ,η, then for
any ν,
η is at least as tempting as ν =) fµ,νg % fµ,ηg.
The axiom simply says that if we replace η with something less tempting, then the agent
is not worse-oﬀ. Intuitively, the lower the temptation in a menu, the lower the self-control
costs associated with resisting temptation. However, the axiom covers also the following
possibility: if ν is less tempting than η and also normatively superior, then ex-post the
agent may optimally choose to submit to temptation, rather than incur any self-control
cost. However, even in this case, the agent would be better oﬀ with fµ,νg than fµ,ηg, as
he would submit to temptation in fµ,νg only because the normative cost of doing so would
be smaller than the self-control cost of resisting, which itself is smaller than the self-control
cost incurred in fµ,ηg.
62.2 Representation Theorem
The most general representation result in this paper is:
Theorem 1 A preference % satisﬁes Order, Continuity, Set-Betweenness, Commitment
Independence, Temptation Independence and Temptation Dependence if and only if there








where u,v : ∆ ! R+ are continuous linear functions and c : ∆£v(∆) ! R+ is a continuous
function that is weakly increasing in its second argument, and satisﬁes:
(i) if v(µ) ¸ l then c(µ,l) = 0;
(ii) if u(µ) > u(η) and l = maxfµ,ηg v then v(µ) < v(η) () c(µ,l) > 0.
A preference % that satisﬁes the noted axiom is referred to as a temptation-dependent
self-control preference, and the representation is a temptation-dependent self-control rep-
resentation. The function c possesses minimal properties required to interpret it as a
self-control cost function. Monotonicity in its second argument reﬂects the fact that choos-
ing any given alternative µ is more costly from menus with greater temptation. Condition
(i) says that the self-control cost of submitting to temptation is zero. Condition (ii) says
that the self-control cost of resisting temptation is strictly positive.
The model accommodates cost functions which embody the idea that any deviation
from the most tempting alternative is costly:
c(µ,l) > 0 () v(µ) < l.
However, the model’s uniqueness properties are such that this is not ensured by the axioms
for all µ,l. If (µ,l) is such that v(µ) < l and there is no η with v(η) = l such that
fµg Â fµ,ηg Â fηg,
then c(µ,l) is unrestricted. The intuition is that alternatives that are always dominated
in both normative and temptation terms are never chosen. Note that the only way that
unchosen alternatives ‘aﬀect’ the ex-ante preference % is if they are most tempting, and in
particular, unchosen alternatives that are never most tempt have no impact on %. Pref-
erences over menus are not rich enough data in order to recover the cost of choosing such
unchosen alternatives, and consequently any cost can be assigned to them – this is reﬂected
formally in the following theorem. This lack of uniqueness is a minimal detraction, if at
all: alternatives that are never most tempting nor ever chosen are also not of interest either
from a descriptive standpoint or a normative one.
Theorem 2 Suppose that (u,v,c) and (u0,v0,c0) are both representations of a nondegen-
erate temptation-dependent self-control preference. Then there exist constants αu,αv > 0





0(µ) ¸ l or fµg Â fµ,ηg Â fηg for some η with v
0(η) = lg.
The straightforward proof is omitted.
3 Convex Model
In this section we present a specialization of our general model that reﬂects two things:
First, the cost of self-control depends on the diﬀerence between temptation utility from
choice and maximum temptation utility possible. Second, the cost of self-control is convex,
thereby capturing the idea of uphill self-control. We ﬁrst formally describe the functional
form and then present its axiomatization.
3.1 Functional Form
As in the general model, let u be a normative utility function and v be a temptation utility
function over lotteries. Both functions are continuous and mixture linear. If µ is chosen
with self-control in fµ,ηg, we refer to the diﬀerence w = v(η) ¡ v(µ) as the magnitude of
temptation frustration, or frustration for short. We now describe a functional form where
the cost of self-control is a convex transformation of w. This requires us to deﬁne the
maximum beneﬁt from self-control among binary menus where the frustration is equal to
w: for all w > 0, let
F(w) ´ supfu(µ)¡u(η)jw = v(η)¡v(µ) for some µ,η s.t. v(η)¡v(µ) > 0 > u(η)¡u(µ)g.
Note that v(η) ¡ v(µ) > 0 > u(η) ¡ u(µ) states that µ is normatively preferred to η, yet η
is more tempting.2 Since u(µ)¡u(η) is the beneﬁt from self-control, F(w) is the maximum
beneﬁt from self-control among binary menus fµ,ηg where frustration, v(η)¡v(µ), equals
w.
Deﬁnition 1 A preference % is a convex self-control preference if there exists a represen-












where u,v : ∆ ! R+ are continuous mixture linear functions and ϕ : [0,max∆ v¡min∆ v] !
R+ is a continuous strictly increasing function such that ϕ(0) = 0 and ϕ is convex on a
non-degenerate interval [0,w] and satisﬁes ϕ(w) ¸ F(w) for w > w.
2This condition is equivalent to fµg Â fµ,ηg.
8Identify any convex self-control representation (4) with the corresponding tuple (u,v,ϕ).
This model describes an agent for whom the costs of self-control increase at an increasing
rate as more self-control is exerted. This is unlike the GP model, where the marginal cost
of exerting self-control is constant. The restriction on ϕ says simply that the agent does
not exercise self-control when frustration exceeds a threshold level w. Since F deﬁnes an
upper bound on the beneﬁt of self-control, it is the case that whenever η tempts µ and
v(η) ¡ v(µ) = w > w, the normative beneﬁt u(µ) ¡ u(η) of self-control is always less than
the self-control cost ϕ(w):
ϕ(w) ¸ F(w) ¸ u(µ) ¡ u(η).
Hence self-control is never exerted outside the interval [0,w]. Indeed, the condition ensures
that self-control costs are convex where it is meaningful.
3.2 Axioms
We augment the general model with three axioms. Each are implied by Independence and
are therefore weaker.








This is a weakening of an axiom introduced by Ergin and Sarver [5], who impose the
axiom on all menus rather than just binary menus. Note that Independence implies that








Weak Binary Independence is the implication of Independence in which the mixing coef-
ﬁcients α,β are equal. The axiom states that the ranking of binary menus fµ,µ0g and
fη,η0g when mixed with a common singleton fνg is independent of the lottery in the
singleton. Intuitively, this reﬂects a ‘translation invariance’ property that states that if
a common ‘translation’ is applied to the elements of both the menus fµ,µ0g and fη,η0g,
then the ranking of the menus is unaﬀected.3 This behavior arises when self-control cost
is measured in terms of the deviation from the most tempting alternative.4
3For any signed measure θ and lottery µ 2 ∆ such that µ+θ 2 ∆ is a lottery, µ+θ is a translate of µ in the
direction θ. Translation Invariance is the property that fµ,µ0g % fη,η0g =) fµ+θ,µ0+θg % fη+θ,η0+θg
for all suitable θ.
4To see this in terms of representations, note that choice from a menu is determined by a comparison
of the cost and beneﬁt of self-control. If these costs and beneﬁts are ‘diﬀerences in utilities’, common
translations of all elements leaves these diﬀerences unchanged, and thus leaves choice unaﬀected. This in
turn ensures that the ranking of any two menus is unaﬀected by common translations of all elements in
the menus.
9Axiom 8 (Mixing Preserves Self-Control (MPSC)) For all µ,η and α 2 (0,1),
fµg Â fµ,ηg Â fηg =) fµg Â fµ,ηαµg Â fηαµg.
MPSC says that, if the agent exhibits self-control at fµ,ηg, then he does so at fµ,ηαµg.
Notice that the temptation frustration between µ and ηαµ is smaller than that between µ
and η, as the ﬁrst pair of alternatives are ‘closer’ to each other. Since we are modelling an
agent whose self-control ability is greater for small deviations from the tempting alternative,
it follows that self-control must be preserved as stated in the axiom.
While the previous axiom describes an implication of uphill self-control on anticipated
choice from menus, the next axiom is a direct expression of uphill self-control in the ranking
of menus. For any menu x, deﬁne its singleton equivalent ex 2 ∆ by fexg » x. Under
Order, Continuity and Commitment Independence, every menu has a singleton equivalent.
Axiom 9 (Self-Control Concavity) For all µ,µ0,η,η0 and α 2 (0,1),








Observe that, due to the vNM structure imposed on underlying temptation preference,
the temptation frustration in the mixed menu fµαµ0,ηαη0g is an average of the temptation
frustration in each of the two menus. Thus, the evaluation of fµαµ0,ηαη0g contains the
self-control cost associated with this average frustration. On the other hand, due to the
linearity of commitment preference, the mixture fefµ,ηgαefµ0,η0gg of singleton equivalents
embodies an average of the self-control costs at the two levels of temptation frustration.
Convexity of self-control costs implies that the self-control cost of the average must be lower
than the average of the self-control costs. The axiom reﬂects precisely this.
3.3 Representation Theorem
Say that % on Z is a self-control preference if there exist µ,µ0 2 ∆ with fµg Â fµ,µ0g Â
fµ0g. The main result of this section is:
Theorem 3 A self-control preference % satisﬁes all the axioms of Theorem 1, Weak Binary
Independence, MPSC, and Self-Control Concavity if and only if % is a convex self-control
preference.
This establishes the behavioral foundations of the convex self-control model. A discus-
sion of the proof of the result is deferred to the next subsection.
Observe that the convex self-control representation requires ϕ to be convex only on an
interval [0,w]. Our axioms do not guarantee that a convex extension to R+ exists. The
issue is technical: in order for the extension to exist it is necessary that ϕ be Lipschitz
continuous on [0,w]. It is possible to describe restrictions on preference that guarantee
this, but we omit them because of their lack of transparency.
As a corollary of the theorem, we obtain the GP model when Self-Control Concavity is
strengthened to a Self-Control Linearity condition:
10Corollary 1 A convex self-control preference % admits a GP representation if and only if
it satisﬁes Self-Control Linearity: For all µ,µ0,η,η0 and α 2 (0,1) s.t. fµg Â fµ,ηg Â fηg




Thus, we see that it is Self-Control Linearity that forces the linear self-control costs
property in GP’s model. This alternative axiomatization of GP’s model provides perspec-
tive on the behavioral foundations of their model by highlighting the various implications
of Independence in the presence of Order, Continuity and Set-Betweenness. Indeed, this
permits a more transparent evaluation of that axiom and, in turn, of the model.
Now turn to the uniqueness properties of the convex self-control representation. Given
a representation (u,v,ϕ), the self-control subdomain is deﬁned as follows:




v]jw = v(η) ¡ v(µ)
for some µ,η s.t. fµg Â fµ,ηg Â fηgg.
If v(η) ¡ v(µ) / 2 R, self-control is never exerted at fµ,ηg. Thus, the actual shape of ϕ
outside R is immaterial in the description of choice behavior. Note that since preference
satisﬁes the MPSC axiom, R is an interval with inf R = 0. Notice also that the threshold
level w associated with the representation must satisﬁes R ½ [0,w] because self-control is
never exerted when v(η) ¡ v(µ) > w.
The uniqueness properties of the representation mirror those of the general representa-
tion.
Theorem 4 Suppose that (u,v,ϕ) and (˜ u, ˜ v, ˜ ϕ) are both representations of a convex self-
control preference. Then there exist constants αu,αv > 0 and βu,βv such that ˜ u = αuu+βu
and ˜ v = αvv + βv. Moreover, when R and ˜ R are the self-control subdomains for ϕ and ˜ ϕ
respectively, ˜ R = αvR and ˜ ϕ(αvw) = αuϕ(w) for all w 2 R.
The theorem states that u and v are unique up to positive aﬃne transformation. When
ϕ, ˜ ϕ are diﬀerentiable, the stated condition on ϕ and ˜ ϕ implies that for ˜ w = αvw and
w 2 R,





where f0 and f00 denote the ﬁrst and the second derivatives of f, respectively. Thus the
curvature of ϕ is uniquely determined within the self-control subdomain.
3.4 Proof Outline for Theorem 3
The main technical diﬃculty is not establishing convexity, but rather showing that the










11We explain next how the function ϕ is derived from preference.
The functions u, v, and W are determined as in the general model. Take any µ,η
satisfying fµg Â fµ,ηg Â fηg. This ranking suggests that µ is chosen with self-control in
fµ,ηg. Hence, the diﬀerence u(µ)¡W(fµ,ηg) should exactly express the cost of self-control
at fµ,ηg. On the other hand, the temptation frustration is w = v(η) ¡ v(µ). Deﬁne
ϕ(v(η) ¡ v(µ)) := u(µ) ¡ W(fµ,ηg). (5)
The key step in the proof is to show that ϕ is indeed well-deﬁned. This is demonstrated
by establishing that for all µ,µ0,η,η0 such that fµg Â fµ,ηg Â fηg and fµ0g Â fµ0,η0g Â
fη0g,
v(η) ¡ v(µ) ¸ v(η
0) ¡ v(µ




The bulk of the proof for this claim concerns the case where µ,µ0,η,η0 have ﬁnite supports
and belong to the interior of ∆µ,µ0,η,η0, the ﬁnite-dimensional set of lotteries over the union
of the supports. The result for general lotteries then obtains by a continuity argument
together with the fact that the set of lotteries with ﬁnite supports is dense in ∆ under the
weak convergence topology. So take such lotteries µ,µ0,η,η0 that satisfy the hypothesis of






That is, since η tempts µ and η0 tempts µ0, it is also true that the mixture ηαη0 tempts the
mixture µαµ0. We observe that there is an open neighborhood O(α) ½ [0,1] of α such that
for any e α 2 O(α),
e α ¸ α () u(µe αµ






That is, small movements from α respect the implication (6).5 This observation makes use
of Weak Binary Independence and in particular Temptation Dependence. But now observe
that fO(α)gα2[0,1] is an open cover of [0,1]. Therefore there exists a ﬁnite subcover, and
indeed, we can ﬁnd a ﬁnite number of mixing coeﬃcients 1 = α0 ¸ α1 ¸ .. ¸ αI = 0 such
that

















Thus, via this ‘chain’ linking u(µ)¡W(fµ,ηg) and u(µ0)¡W(fµ0,η0g) we are able to prove
(6).
An immediate implication of (6) is that
v(η) ¡ v(µ) = v(η
0) ¡ v(µ




It then follows that ϕ as deﬁned in (5) is indeed well-deﬁned (in fact it also follows that it
is increasing).
5By linearity of v, if v(η)¡v(µ) ¸ v(η0)¡v(µ0), then e α ¸ α () v(ηe αη0)¡v(µe αµ0) ¸ v(ηαη0)¡v(µαµ0)
124 Concluding Remarks: Ex post Choice
While the convex self-control model is a representation for an ex ante preference over menus,












We conclude this paper with some observations about this choice correspondence in the
context of choice under risk.
An immediate observation is that Cϕ is menu-dependent via its dependence on the
most tempting alternative in the menu. If ϕ is convex, for instance, this would imply
that while an agent can pick a ‘good’ alternative over a moderately tempting alternative,
adding an even more tempting alternative to the menu may induce the agent to choose the
moderately tempting alternative, thereby violating the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference.
The intuition for such choice is that the loss of self-control ability due to the presence of
a great temptation may make the agent unable to choose the ‘good’ alternative, but he
may nevertheless have enough self-control to resist the great temptation. He chooses the
moderately tempting alternative as a compromise. An analysis of the notion of menu-
dependent self-control can be found in a companion paper (Noor and Takeoka [14]).
The choice structure as given by (7) has an interesting implication for choice under
risk: choice between risky prospects may not be explicable by expected utility theory. In
fact, the model may accommodate the common ratio eﬀect (Allais [2], Kahneman and
Tversky [11]). To illustrate, consider an agent who normatively prefers a risky lottery r to
a riskless one s but is tempted by the latter. Moreover, suppose he exhibits
frg Â fr,sg » fsg, and frαsg Â frαs,sg Â fsg for some α 2 (0,1).
The former ranking suggests that the agent yields to temptation at fr,sg and ends up with
choosing tempting option s, while the latter ranking says that he exercises self-control at
frαs,sg and chooses rαs over s, that is, mixing r with s induces self-control. Since frαs,sg
is obtained by mixing fr,sg and fsg with proportion α, this preference reversal has the
spirit of the common ratio eﬀect. In the convex self-control model, this choice pattern is
rationalized if both
u(s) ¸ u(r) ¡ ϕ(v(s) ¡ v(r)), and u(rαs) ¡ ϕ(v(s) ¡ v(rαs)) > u(s)
hold. That is,




These inequalities can hold when ϕ is convex.
Observe that the utility function in (7) is concave in µ when ϕ is convex. This feature
distinguishes choice behavior of this model from that of other non-expected utility models
satisfying monotonicity with respect to ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. Given the fact
13that s is preferred to r, the monotonicity condition requires that s should be preferred to
any mixed options rαs, whereas some rαs may be strictly preferred to both r and s when
ϕ is convex. Intuitively, this is because the mixed option rαs is a good compromise for the
conﬂict between normative and temptation utilities. In terms of preference over menus,
this property implies that fr,rαs,sg may be strictly preferred to fr,sg.
To conclude, we note that the convex model lends itself to an inﬁnite horizon extension
in the spirit of [9, 13]. In this setting, convexity potentially has interesting implications for
the interaction of risk and time preferences and also for the timing of resolution of risk.
A Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of necessity of the axioms is routine. For Temptation Dependence, observe
that since v(ν) · v(η) and c(µ,¢) is weakly increasing, W(fµ,ηg) = u(µ) ¡ c(µ,v(η)) ·
u(µ) ¡ c(µ,v(ν)) · W(fµ,νg).
Suﬃency of the axioms is established in a sequence of lemmas.
Lemma 1 (i) There exists a continuous linear function u : ∆ ! R+ such that
fµg % fηg () u(µ) ¸ u(η)
(ii) There exists a continuous function W : Z ! R+ that represents % and satisﬁes
W(fµg) = u(µ) for all µ 2 ∆.
(iii) There exists a continuous linear function v : ∆ ! R+ such that if fµg Â fηg then
fµg Â fµ,ηg () v(η) > v(µ).
Proof. (i) The ﬁrst assertion follows from Order, Continuity, Commitment Independence,
and the mixture space theorem.
(ii) Since u is continuous on ∆, there exist a maximal and a minimal lottery µ∆,µ∆ 2 ∆
with respect to u. Without loss of generality, we can assume u(µ∆) = 1 and u(µ∆) = 0.
From Continuity and Set Betweenness, fµ∆g % x % fµ∆g for all x 2 Z. By a standard argu-




Then W represents %. Moreover, W(fµg) = u(µ) for all µ 2 ∆.
To show continuity of W, let xn ! x. Since u(µ∆) = 1 and u(µ∆) = 0, W(x) = α(x).
So we want to show α(xn) ! α(x). By contradiction, suppose otherwise. Then, there exists
a neighborhood B(α(x)) of α(x) such that α(xm) / 2 B(α(x)) for inﬁnitely many m. Let
fxmg denote the corresponding subsequence of fxng. Since xn ! x, fxmg also converges to
x. Since fα(xm)g is a sequence in [0,1], there exists a convergent subsequence fα(x )g with
14a limit α 6= α(x). On the other hand, since x  ! x and x  » fµ∆α(x )µ∆g, Continuity
implies x » fµ∆αµ∆g. Since α(x) is unique, α(x) = α, which is a contradiction.
(iii) See Noor and Takeoka [14, Lemma 9].
Without loss of generality, assume that v(∆) = [0,1]. By construction, if fµg Â fµ,ηg,
then v(η) > v(µ). If fµg » fµ,ηg Â fηg, then v(µ) ¸ v(η).
Lemma 2 For all µ,η,ν 2 ∆, if fµg Â fµ,ηg Â fηg and v(ν) · v(η), then fµ,νg %
fµ,ηg.
Proof. The ﬁrst case is where fνg % fηg. Since fµg Â fµ,ηg, we know u(µ) > u(η)
and v(µ) < v(η). For all α 2 (0,1), v(η) > v(ναµ) and u(ναµ) > u(η). Thus fναµg Â
fναµ,ηg. By Temptation Dependence, fµ,ναµg % fµ,ηg. By Continuity, we have fµ,νg %
fµ,ηg as α ! 1.
Next suppose fηg Â fνg. If fηg Â fη,νg, we have v(ν) > v(η), which contradicts
the assumption. Hence Set Betweenness implies fηg » fη,νg Â fνg. By Temptation
Dependence, fµ,νg % fµ,ηg.
Deﬁne the correspondence L : v(∆) Ã ∆ by:
L(l) := fη : v(η) · lg.
By continuity and linearity of v, it is clear that L(l) is a nonempty compact convex set for








The following Lemma clariﬁes various properties of c. Properties (iii)-(vi) correspond to
the properties in the statement of the Theorem.
Lemma 3 (i) For any µ,l, if fµg Â fµ,ηg Â fηg for some η with v(η) = l, then c(µ,l) =
u(µ) ¡ W(fµ,ηg) > 0.
(ii) For any µ,l, if fµg Â fµ,ηg for some η 2 L(l), then c(µ,l) > 0.
(iii) For any µ,l, if l · v(µ) then c(µ,l) = 0.
(iv) If u(µ) > u(η) and l = maxµ,η v then
v(µ) < v(η) () c(µ,l) > 0.
(v) For any µ, c(µ,¢) is weakly increasing.
(vi) The function c is continuous.
Proof. (i) For any ν 2 L(l), v(ν) · v(η), and thus by Lemma 2, u(µ) ¡ W(fµ,νg) ·
u(µ) ¡ W(fµ,ηg). Since η 2 L(l), it follows that maxν2L(l)fu(µ) ¡ W(fµ,νg)g = u(µ) ¡
W(fµ,ηg) > 0 and thus c(µ,l) = u(µ) ¡ W(fµ,ηg).
(ii) Obvious from the deﬁnition of c.
15(iii) Under the hypothesis, fµg 6Â fµ,ηg for all η 2 L(l). Consequently maxν2L(l)fu(µ)¡
W(fµ,νg)g · 0 and so c(µ,l) = 0.
(iv) Suﬃciency obtains from part (ii). For the converse, note that if v(µ) ¸ v(η) then
l = v(µ), and thus part (iii) implies c(µ,l) = 0.
(v) For any l,l0 2 v(∆),
l0 < l
=) L(l0) ½ L(l)
=) maxν2L(l0)fu(µ) ¡ W(fµ,νg)g · maxν2L(l)fu(µ) ¡ W(fµ,νg)g
=) c(µ,l0) · c(µ,l).
(vi) We show below that L : v(∆) Ã ∆ is a continuous correspondence. The assertion
then follows from the following argument: Since u and W are continuous, the Maximum
Theorem implies that (µ,l) 7! maxν2L(l)fu(µ)¡W(fµ,νg)g is continuous. Moreover, since
the upper envelope of two continuous functions is continuous, the function c is continuous.
To show that L is upper hemicontinuous, take any sequence flng ½ v(∆) that converges
to some l 2 v(∆), and suppose that ηn 2 L(ln) for each n. We must show that there is a
subsequence fln(m)g s.t. ηn(m) ! η for some η 2 L(l). Since fηng is a sequence in a compact
set ∆, it has a convergent subsequence ηn(m) ! η for some η. Since v(ηn(m)) · ln(m) for
each m, and since v is continuous, it follows that v(η) · l, and thus η 2 L(l), as desired.
To show that L is lower hemicontinuous, take any sequence flng ½ v(∆) that converges
to some l 2 v(∆), and suppose that η 2 L(l). We must show that there exists a subsequence
fln(m)g s.t. ηn(m) ! η, where ηn(m) 2 L(ln(m)) for each m. Consider two possibilities:
i - There exists N s.t. ln ¸ v(η) for all n ¸ N.
Then η 2 L(ln) for each n ¸ N. In particular, lower hemicontinuity is established
by taking the subsequence flN,lN+1,...g and the corresponding trivial sequence fηg that
converges to η.
ii - For all N there exists nN ¸ N s.t. ln < v(η).
Take the subsequence fln(m)g satisfying ln(m) < v(η) for all m. Construct fηn(m)g as
follows: Let η¤ be the minimizer of v over ∆ (normalized so that v(η¤) = 0) and let αn(m)
satisfy v(ηαn(m)η¤) = ln(m)
v(η)
l · ln(m).6 Then ηn(m) 2 L(ln(m)), where ηn(m) := ηαn(m)η¤ for




=) αn(m)v(η) = ln(m)
v(η)
l (since v is linear and v(η¤) = 0)
=) αn(m) =
ln(m)
l (note that v(η) > 0 since v(η) > ln(m) ¸ 0, and also note that
ln(m)
l < 1 since lnm < v(η) · l).
Since ln(m) ! l, it follows that αn(m) ! 1, and in turn, ηn(m) ! η, as desired.











6Note that l > 0, otherwise 0 · ln(m) < v(η) · l = 0 is a contradiction. Recall also that η 2 L(l)
implies v(η) · l, and thus ln(m)
v(η)
l · ln(m).
16Proof. Consider the various cases. In each case, let l = maxfµ,ηg v.
(i) fµg Â fµ,ηg Â fηg.
Since v(µ) < v(η) = l, Lemma 3(i) implies W(fµ,ηg) = u(µ) ¡ c(µ,l) = u(µ) ¡
c(µ,maxfµ,ηg v). Since c(η,l) = 0, we have u(η)¡c(η,maxfµ,ηg v) = u(η), and since fµ,ηg Â
fηg, it follows that
u(µ) ¡ c(µ,max
fµ,ηg
v) > u(η) ¡ c(η,max
fµ,ηg
v).
Indeed, W(fµ,ηg) = maxν2fµ,ηg u(ν) ¡ c(ν,maxfµ,ηg v), as desired.
(ii) fµg Â fµ,ηg » fηg.
By deﬁnition of c(µ,l),
c(µ,l) ¸ max
ν2L(l)
fu(µ) ¡ W(fµ,νg)g ¸ u(µ) ¡ W(fµ,ηg).
In particular, W(fµ,ηg) ¸ u(µ) ¡ c(µ,l) = u(µ) ¡ c(µ,maxfµ,ηg v). Then
u(η) ¡ c(η,max
fµ,ηg
v) = u(η) = W(fµ,ηg) ¸ u(µ) ¡ c(µ,max
fµ,ηg
v),
and hence W(fµ,ηg) = maxν2fµ,ηg u(ν) ¡ c(ν,maxfµ,ηg v).
(iii) fµg » fµ,ηg Â fηg or fηg » fη,µg % fµg.
Suppose fµg » fµ,ηg Â fηg. Then l = v(µ) ¸ v(η), and in particular, c(µ,l) = 0.
Since c(η,l) ¸ 0,
W(fµ,ηg) = u(µ)
= u(µ) ¡ c(µ,maxfµ,ηg v)
= u(η) since fµg Â fηg and c(µ,l) = 0
¸ u(η) ¡ c(η,l) since c(η,l) ¸ 0. This establishes the result.
For the case where fηg » fη,µg % fµg, we have l = v(η) ¸ v(µ) (this is wlog when
fµg » fµ,ηg » fηg), c(η,l) = 0 and c(µ,l) ¸ 0. Arguing as above yields the result.
(iv) fηg Â fη,µg % fµg.
The argument is analogous to that in cases (i) and (ii).










Proof. The argument is similar that used in the conclusion of the proof [8, Thm 1]. Gul




η2x W(fµ,ηg) = min
η2x max
µ2x W(fµ,ηg). (8)
Fix µ 2 x arbitrarily. Since c(ν,¢) is weakly increasing for all ν,
min

























17where ηµ is a minimizer of the associated minimization problem. Since the above inequality






























































where µη is a minimizer of the associated minimization problem. Since c(ν,¢) is weakly






























Taking (9) and (10) together, the desired result holds.
Lemma 6 For all x 2 Z, W can be written as the desired form.
Proof. By Lemma 0 of Gul and Pesendorfer [8, p.1421], there exists a sequence of subsets






















On the other hand, by Lemma 1 (ii), W(xn) ! W(x). This completes the proof.
B Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3
Proof of necessity of axioms is omitted. The proof of suﬃency is as follows.
Let (u,v,W) be the objects guaranteed by Lemma 1. Since u and v are mixture linear,
assume that u(∆) = v(∆) = [0,1].
Let
A ´ fw 2 [0,1]jw = v(η) ¡ v(µ), for some µ,η such that fµg Â fµ,ηg Â fηgg.
Since % is a self-control preference, A is non-empty.
18Lemma 7 (i) A is an interval with inf A = 0, and (ii) if supA 2 A, then supA = 1.
Proof. (i) It suﬃces to show that for all w 2 A, αw 2 A for all α 2 (0,1). Let w 2 A.
There exist µ,η such that w = v(η) ¡ v(µ) and fµg Â fµ,ηg Â fηg. By MPSC, fµg Â
fµ,ηαµg Â fηαµg. Thus αw = α(v(η) ¡ v(µ)) = v(ηαµ) ¡ v(µ) 2 A.
(ii) Since supA 2 A, there exist µ,η such that fµg Â fµ,ηg Â fηg and v(η) ¡ v(µ) =
supA. By contradiction, suppose supA < 1. Then, either max∆ v > v(η) or min∆ v < v(µ).
In case of the former, Continuity implies that there exists ν suﬃciently close to η such that
fµg Â fµ,νg Â fνg and v(ν) > v(η). Thus supA < v(ν) ¡ v(µ) 2 A, which is a
contradiction. The symmetric argument can be applied to the latter case.
Deﬁne ϕ : A ! (0,1] by
ϕ(w) ´ u(µ) ¡ W(fµ,ηg),
where µ,η satisfy fµg Â fµ,ηg Â fηg and w = v(η) ¡ v(µ).
The lemmas below establish that ϕ is well-deﬁned.
Lemma 8 For all µ,η,µ0,η0 2 ∆ and α 2 (0,1), If fµg Â fµ,ηg Â fηg and fµ0g Â
fµ0,η0g Â fη0g, then fµαµ0g Â fµαµ0,ηαη0g Â fηαη0g for all α 2 [0,1].
Proof. Since fµg Â fµ,ηg and fµ0g Â fµ0,η0g, we have u(µ) > u(η), v(η) > v(µ),
u(µ0) > u(η0), and v(η0) > v(µ0). Since u and v are mixture linear, u(µαµ0) > u(ηαη0) and
v(ηαη0) > v(µαµ0), and, hence, fµαµ0g Â fµαµ0,ηαη0g. As shown in Lemma1 (ii), there
exist ν,ν0 2 ∆ such that fµ,ηg » fνg and fµ0,η0g » fν0g. By Self-Control Concavity,
fµαµ0,ηαη0g % fναν0g. Since fνg Â fηg and fν0g Â fη0g, Commitment Independence im-
plies that fναν0g Â fηαη0g for all α 2 [0,1]. Therefore, we have fµαµ0g Â fµαµ0,ηαη0g Â
fηαη0g.

























For all µ 2 ∆(N,c) and θ 2 Θ(N,c), if µ + θ 2 ∆(N,c), we can view µ + θ as the lottery
obtained by shifting µ toward θ. For all µ 2 ∆(N,c), say that θ 2 Θ(N,c) is admissible for µ
if µ + θ 2 ∆(N,c).
Lemma 9 Given any two menus x,y ½ ∆(N,c), the following statements are equivalent:
(a) For all α 2 [0,1] and µ,η 2 ∆(N,c), xαfµg % yαfµg =) xαfηg % yαfηg.
(b) For all θ 2 Θ(N,c) that are admissible for x,y, x % y () x + θ % y + θ.
Proof. Inspecting the proof of Ergin and Sarver [5, Lemma 6] reveals that the proof works
for any two ﬁxed menus x,y.
The preceding lemma yields that Weak Binary Independence is equivalent to the con-




0g =) fµ + θ,µ
0 + θg % fη + θ,η
0 + θg, (12)
19which is referred to as Translation Invariance.
For all θ 2 Θ(N,c), let u(θ) denote
P
i u(ci)θ(ci).
Lemma 10 For all µ,µ0 2 ∆(N,c) and θ 2 Θ(N,c), if µ + θ,µ0 + θ 2 ∆(N,c), then W(fµ +
θ,µ0 + θg) = W(fµ,µ0g) + u(θ).
Proof. By Set Betweenness, assume that fµg % fµ,µ0g % fµ0g. Since u is continuous,
there exists α 2 [0,1] such that W(fµ,µ0g) = u(µαµ0). If µ+θ,µ0 +θ 2 ∆(N,c), µαµ0 +θ =
(µ + θ)α(µ0 + θ) 2 ∆(N,c). Hence Translation Invariance implies that
W(fµ + θ,µ
0 + θ)g) = u(µαµ
0 + θ) = u(µαµ
0) + u(θ) = W(fµ,µ
0g) + u(θ).
Lemma 11 Take all µ,µ0,η,η0 2 ∆ with ﬁnite supports. Assume that fµg Â fµ,ηg Â fηg
and fµ0g Â fµ0,η0g Â fη0g. Then,
v(η) ¡ v(µ) ¸ v(η
0) ¡ v(µ




Proof. Let c ´ fc1,¢¢¢ ,cNg ½ C be the union of the supports of µ,µ0,η,η0. Hence, these
lotteries belong to ∆(N,c).
Step 1: We claim that if θ ´ µ0¡µ 2 Θ(N,c) is admissible for η, then u(µ)¡W(fµ,ηg) ¸
u(µ0) ¡ W(fµ0,η0g). Since v is mixture linear,
v(η + θ) ¡ v(µ
0) = v(η + θ) ¡ v(µ + θ) = v(η) ¡ v(µ) ¸ v(η
0) ¡ v(µ
0).
Thus v(η + θ) ¸ v(η0). Furthermore, by Translation Invariance as given in (12), fµ +
θg Â fµ + θ,η + θg Â fη + θg, that is, fµ0g Â fµ0,η + θg Â fη + θg. By Lemma 2,


















0g) · u(µ) ¡ W(fµ,ηg).
Take a lottery ν in the interior of ∆(N,c). For all α 2 (0,1) suﬃciently close to one, let
a ´ µαν, b ´ ηαν, a0 ´ µ0αν, b0 ´ η0αν 2 ∆(N,c). Continuity implies fag Â fa,bg Â fbg
and fa0g Â fa0,b0g Â fb0g. Furthermore, v(b)¡v(a) = v(ηαν)¡v(µαν) = α(v(η)¡v(µ)) ¸
α(v(η0) ¡ v(µ0)) = v(b0) ¡ v(a0). From Lemma 8, for all β 2 [0,1], faβa0g Â faβa0,bβb0g Â
fbβb0g. Notice also that aβa0, bβb0 2 ∆(N,c) for all β 2 [0,1].
Step 2: We claim that for all β 2 [0,1], there exists a relative open interval O(β)
containing β such that for all ˜ β 2 O(β),
˜ β ¸ β () u(a˜ βa






20Since v(b) ¡ v(a) ¸ v(b0) ¡ v(a0), we have, for all ˜ β 2 (0,1) with ˜ β ¸ β,
v(bβb
0) ¡ v(aβa
0) = β(v(b) ¡ v(a)) + (1 ¡ β)(v(b
0) ¡ v(a
0))
· ˜ β(v(b) ¡ v(a)) + (1 ¡ ˜ β)(v(b
0) ¡ v(a
0)) = v(b˜ βb
0) ¡ v(a˜ βa
0).
Let θ ´ aβa0 ¡ a˜ βa0 2 Θ(N,c). Notice that
b˜ βb
0 + θ = (η˜ βη
0)αν + (β ¡ ˜ β)(a ¡ a
0).
Since (ηβη0)αν is in the interior of ∆(N,c), there exists a relative open interval O(β) con-
taining β such that (η˜ βη0)αν + (β ¡ ˜ β)(a ¡ a0) 2 ∆(N,c) for all ˜ β 2 O(β). That is, for all
˜ β 2 O(β), θ is admissible for b˜ βb0. Thus, by Step 1, we have (13).
Step 3: We claim that u(a) ¡ W(fa,bg) ¸ u(a0) ¡ W(fa0,b0g). Let O(β) be an open
interval containing β 2 [0,1] guaranteed by Step 2. Since fO(β)jβ 2 [0,1]g is an open
cover of [0,1], there exists a ﬁnite subcover, denoted by fO(βi)ji = 1,¢¢¢ ,Ig. Without
loss of generality, assume βi · βi+1. Deﬁne β0 = 0 and βI+1 = 1. Since β0 2 O(β1) and

















0g) = u(a) ¡ W(fa,bg).
From Step 3, for all α 2 (0,1) suﬃciently close to one,




Continuity ensures that u(µ) ¡ W(fµ,ηg) ¸ u(µ0) ¡ W(fµ0,η0g) as α ! 1.
Lemma 12 For all µ,µ0,η,η0 2 ∆ such that fµg Â fµ,ηg Â fηg and fµ0g Â fµ0,η0g Â
fη0g,
v(η) ¡ v(µ) ¸ v(η
0) ¡ v(µ




Proof. Let µ+ and µ¡ be a maximal and a minimal lottery in ∆ with respect to v. By
continuity and mixture linearity of v, for all α suﬃciently close to one, v(ηαµ+) ¡ v(µ) >
v(η0αµ¡) ¡ v(µ0). Since the set of lotteries with ﬁnite supports is dense in ∆ under the
weak convergence topology (Aliprantis and Border [1, p.513, Theorem 15.10]), there exist
sequences fµng, fηng, fµ0
ng, and fη0
ng with ﬁnite supports such that µn ! µ, ηn ! ηαµ+,
µ0
n ! µ0, and η0





ng), and, by continuity of v, v(ηn)¡v(µn) >
v(η0
n)¡v(µ0




Continuity of u and W implies that u(µ) ¡ W(fµ,ηαµ+g) ¸ u(µ0) ¡ W(fµ0,η0αµ¡g) as
n ! 1. Again, by continuity, u(µ) ¡ W(fµ,ηg) ¸ u(µ0) ¡ W(fµ0,η0g) as α ! 1.
Lemma 13 ϕ : A ! (0,1] is (i) well-deﬁned, (ii) weakly increasing, and (iii) continuous.
21Proof. (i) Take any µ,µ0,η,η0 such that fµg Â fµ,ηg Â fηg and fµ0g Â fµ0,η0g Â fη0g.
From Lemma 12, if v(η) ¡ v(µ) = v(η0) ¡ v(µ0), u(µ) ¡ W(fµ,ηg) = u(µ0) ¡ W(fµ0,η0g).
Hence, ϕ is well-deﬁned.
(ii) Take w,w0 2 A such that w0 < w. There exist µ,µ0,η,η0 such that fµg Â fµ,ηg Â
fηg, fµ0g Â fµ0,η0g Â fη0g, w = v(η) ¡ v(µ), and w0 = v(η0) ¡ v(µ0). By Lemma 12,
ϕ(w) = u(µ) ¡ W(fµ,ηg) ¸ u(µ0) ¡ W(fµ0,η0g) = ϕ(w0).
(iii) Take any w0 2 A. For any sequence wn ! w0, n = 1,2,¢¢¢, we want to show
that ϕ(wn) ! ϕ(w0). First suppose w0 < supA. Take any w 2 (w0,supA). There exist
µ,η such that fµg Â fµ,ηg Â fηg and w = v(η) ¡ v(µ). Since wn ! w, wn < w for
all suﬃciently large n. Deﬁne αn ´ wn
w for n = 0 and all suﬃciently large n. By MPSC,





nµg) = u(µ) ¡ W(fµ,ηα
0µg) = ϕ(w
0).
Next suppose w0 = supA. Since w0 2 A, There exist µ,η such that fµg Â fµ,ηg Â fηg
and w0 = v(η) ¡ v(µ). Deﬁne αn ´ wn
w0 2 (0,1]. By MPSC, fµg Â fµ,ηαnµg Â fηαnµg.





nµg) = u(µ) ¡ W(fµ,ηg) = ϕ(w
0).
Denote the closure of A by A. By Lemma 7 (i), A is a closed non-degenerate interval
including 0. Let w = supA. Deﬁne ϕ(0) = inffϕ(w)jw 2 Ag and ϕ(w) = supfϕ(w)jw 2
Ag.
Lemma 14 ϕ : A ! [0,1] is a unique continuous and weakly increasing extension of ϕ.
Moreover, (i) ϕ(0) = 0, (ii) ϕ is weakly convex, and (iii) strictly increasing.
Proof. Since ϕ is continuous and weakly increasing, the former statement holds.
(i) We show that ϕ(0) = 0. Take any w 2 A. There exist µ,η such that w = v(η)¡v(µ)
and fµg Â fµ,ηg Â fηg. By MPSC, fµg Â fµ,ηαµg Â fηαµg for all α 2 (0,1). Thus,
ϕ(0) = lim
α!0ϕ(αw) = lim
α!0u(µ) ¡ W(fµ,ηαµg) = 0.
(ii) We show that ϕ is convex on A. Then, by continuity, ϕ is convex on A. Take
any wi 2 (0,w), i = 1,2. Without loss of generality, assume w1 < w2. There exists
µ,η2 2 ∆ such that fµg Â fµ,η2g Â fη2g and w2 = v(η2) ¡ v(µ). Let η1 = η2
w1
w2µ. Then,
w1 = v(η1) ¡ v(µ). Moreover, by MPSC, fµg Â fµ,η1g Â fη1g. Since v is mixture linear,
αw1+(1¡α)w2 = v(η1αη2)¡v(µ) for all α 2 (0,1). By MPSC, fµg Â fµ,η1αη2g Â fη1αη2g.
In the proof of Lemma 1 (ii), we show that for all x 2 Z, there exists ν 2 ∆ such that
fνg » x. Let νi 2 ∆ satisfy fνig » fµ,ηig. By Self-Control Concavity, fµ,η1αη2g %
fν1αν2g. Thus, we have
ϕ(αw1 + (1 ¡ α)w2) = u(µ) ¡ W(fµ,η1αη2g)
· u(µ) ¡ u(ν1αν2) = α(u(µ) ¡ u(ν1)) + (1 ¡ α)(u(µ) ¡ u(ν2))
= α(u(µ) ¡ W(fµ,η1g)) + (1 ¡ α)(u(µ) ¡ W(fµ,η2g))
= αϕ(w1) + (1 ¡ α)ϕ(w2).
22(iii) First of all, since ϕ(0) = 0, ϕ(0) < ϕ(w) for all w 6= 0. Next, take w,w0 2 A such
that w0 > w > 0. There exists α 2 (0,1) with w = αw0. Since ϕ is convex,
ϕ(w) = ϕ(αw
0) · αϕ(w
0) + (1 ¡ α)ϕ(0) < ϕ(w
0),
as desired.
Lemma 15 Let fµg Â fµ,ηg » fηg. If v(η)¡v(µ) 2 A, then u(η) ¸ u(µ)¡ϕ(v(η)¡v(µ)).
Proof. There exist µ0,η0 such that fµ0g Â fµ0,η0g Â fη0g and v(η0) ¡ v(µ0) = v(η) ¡ v(µ).
Since ϕ(v(η) ¡ v(µ)) = ϕ(v(η0) ¡ v(µ0)) = u(µ0) ¡ W(fµ0,η0g), it suﬃces to show that
u(µ0) ¡ W(fµ0,η0g) ¸ u(µ) ¡ u(η).
We will claim that u(µ0)¡u(η0) > u(µ)¡u(η). Suppose otherwise, that is, u(µ)¡u(η) ¸
u(µ0) ¡ u(η0). Let





By assumption, 0 2 L and 1 / 2 L. Moreover, by Continuity, L is open in [0,1]. Let
¯ α ´ supL 2 (0,1]. By Continuity, ¯ α / 2 L, and hence
fµ¯ αµ
0g Â fµ¯ αµ
0,η¯ αη
0g » fη¯ αη
0g. (14)






for all α 2 [0,1]. On the other hand, since ¯ α is a supremum of L, there exists a sequence
fαng in L converging to ¯ α. We have fµαnµ0g Â fµαnµ0,ηαnη0g Â fηαnη0g, and hence
u(µαnµ0)¡u(ηαnη0) > ϕ(v(ηαnη0)¡v(µαnµ0)) = u(µαnµ0)¡W(fµαnµ0,ηαnη0g). Continuity
and (15) imply u(µ¯ αµ0) ¡ u(η¯ αη0) > ϕ(v(η¯ αη0) ¡ v(µ¯ αµ0)) = u(µ¯ αµ0) ¡ W(fµ¯ αµ0,η¯ αη0g),
that is, W(fµ¯ αµ0,η¯ αη0g) > u(η¯ αη0), which contradicts (14).
Since v(η0) ¡ v(µ0) = v(ηαη0) ¡ v(µαµ0) for all α 2 L, by Lemma 13 (i), u(µ0) ¡





0g) = u(µ¯ αµ
0) ¡ W(fµ¯ αµ
0,η¯ αη
0g) = u(µ¯ αµ
0) ¡ u(η¯ αη
0)
= ¯ α(u(µ) ¡ u(η)) + (1 ¡ ¯ α)(u(µ
0) ¡ u(η
0)) ¸ u(µ) ¡ u(η),
as desired.
Let
B ´ fw 2 [0,1]jw = v(η) ¡ v(µ) for some fµg Â fµ,ηgg. (16)
By Continuity, B is open in [0,1]. If fµg Â fµ,ηg, then fµg Â fµ,ηαµg for all
α 2 (0,1). Hence, B is an interval satisfying inf B = 0. Moreover, by deﬁnition, A ½ B,
or supA · supB.
Deﬁne F : B ! R+ by
F(w) ´ supfu(µ) ¡ u(η)jw = v(η) ¡ v(µ) for some fµg Â fµ,ηgg. (17)
23Lemma 16 F is weakly concave.
Proof. Take wi 2 B, i = 1,2, and α 2 (0,1). There exist µn
i ,ηn





i ) ¡ v(µn
i ) = wi, and, u(µn
i ) ¡ u(ηn
i ) ! F(wi). Since v(ηn
i ) > v(µn
i ) and
u(µn
i ) > u(ηn



















































= αF(w1) + (1 ¡ α)F(w2).
By Theorem 10.3 [16, p.85], F can be uniquely extended to the closure of B in a
continuous and concave way.
Lemma 17 (i) F(w) > ϕ(w) for all w 2 A. (ii) F(w) ¸ ϕ(w). (iii) If w / 2 A, F(w) =
ϕ(w).
Proof. (i) There exist µ,η such that fµg Â fµ,ηg Â fηg and w = v(η) ¡ v(µ). By
deﬁnition,
F(w) ¸ u(µ) ¡ u(η) > u(µ) ¡ W(fµ,ηg) = ϕ(w).
(ii) By Lemma 13 (iii), ϕ is continuous. Moreover, since F is concave, F is continuous.
For any sequence wn ! w, by part (i), F(wn) > ϕ(wn). By continuity of F and ϕ,
F(w) ¸ ϕ(w).
(iii) Take any sequence wn 2 A satisfying wn ! w. By part (ii), F(w) ¸ ϕ(w). By
contradiction, suppose F(w) > ϕ(w) = supfϕ(w)jw 2 Ag. For all w 2 A and µ,η 2 ∆
such that w = v(η) ¡ v(µ) and fµg Â fµ,ηg » fηg, by Lemma 15, we must have ϕ(w) ¸
u(µ) ¡ u(η). Thus there exist sequences wn ! w, fµng1
n=1 and fηng1
n=1 such that wn =
v(ηn) ¡ v(µn) 2 A, fµng Â fµn,ηng Â fηng, and u(µn) ¡ u(ηn) > c > supfϕ(w)jw 2 Ag,
where c > 0 is a constant number. Since fµng1
n=1 and fηng1
n=1 are sequences in ∆, we can
assume µn ! µ0 and ηn ! η0 without loss of generality. Since
u(µ
n) ¡ u(η






continuity implies u(µ0) ¡ u(η0) > u(µ0) ¡ W(fµ0,η0g), that is, W(fµ0,η0g) > u(η0). On
the other hand, since w = v(η0) ¡ v(µ0) > 0 and u(µ0) > u(η0), we have fµ0g Â fµ0,η0g.
Hence fµ0g Â fµ0,η0g Â fη0g, which contradicts w / 2 A.
Since v(∆) = [0,1], maxx v ¡ v(µ) 2 [0,1] for all x 2 Z and µ 2 x. Now we deﬁne a
function ϕ : [0,1] ! R+ as follows:
ϕ(w) ´
½
ϕ(w) if w 2 [0,w]
ϕ(w)
w w if w 2 (w,1].
(18)
24Lemma 18 ϕ is continuous, strictly increasing, and satisﬁes
ϕ(w)
½
= ϕ(w) if w 2 A
¸ F(w) elsewhere.




w w is continuous and increasing on (w,1]. Since ϕ(w) = ϕ(w), ϕ is continuous
and strictly increasing on [0,1].
If w 2 A, w = 1 by Lemma 7 (ii). Assume w 62 A. Since F is concave, there exists a
supporting aﬃne function L at (w,F(w)). That is, L satisﬁes that L(w) ¸ F(w) for all w
and L(w) = F(w). Since L is an aﬃne function, L(w) can be written as aw + b for some
a,b 2 R. If b < 0, for small w, L(w) < 0 and hence ϕ(w) < F(w) · L(w) < 0, which is a







Moreover, by Lemma, ϕ(w) = F(w). Thus, we have
ϕ(w)







= 0 if w = w
¸ 0 if w > w
· 0 if w < w.
(19)




w ¸ L(w) ¸ F(w),
as desired.











Proof. Without loss of generality, assume fµg % fηg. By Set Betweenness, fµg % fµ,ηg %
fηg. There are four cases:
Case (i) fµg Â fµ,ηg Â fηg. In this case, v(η) > v(µ). By deﬁnition of ϕ, W(fµ,ηg) =
u(µ) ¡ ϕ(v(η) ¡ v(µ)) > u(η). Thus W(fµ,ηg) can be expressed as the desired form.
Case (ii) fµg Â fµ,ηg » fηg: We have v(η) > v(µ). If v(η) ¡ v(µ) 2 A, by Lemma 15,
W(fµ,ηg) = u(η) ¸ u(µ) ¡ ϕ(v(η) ¡ v(µ)) as desired. If v(η) ¡ v(µ) / 2 A, we have either
v(η)¡v(µ) = supA or v(η)¡v(µ) / 2 A. The former case implies ϕ(v(η)¡v(µ)) = F(v(η)¡
v(µ)) by Lemma 17 (iii). For the latter case, by Lemma 18, ϕ(v(η)¡v(µ)) ¸ F(v(η)¡v(µ)).
Thus, in each case,
ϕ(v(η) ¡ v(µ)) ¸ F(v(η) ¡ v(µ)) ¸ u(µ) ¡ u(η).
25Thus, W(fµ,ηg) = u(η) ¸ u(µ) ¡ ϕ(v(η) ¡ v(µ)).
Case (iii) fµg » fµ,ηg Â fηg. By construction of v, v(µ) ¸ v(η). Since W(fµ,ηg) =
u(µ) > u(η) ¡ ϕ(v(µ) ¡ v(η)), W(fµ,ηg) is represented by the desired form.
Case (iv) fµg » fµ,ηg » fηg. If v(η) ¸ v(µ), W(fµ,ηg) = u(η) ¸ u(µ)¡ϕ(v(η)¡v(µ)).
If v(µ) ¸ v(η), we have W(fµ,ηg) = u(µ) ¸ u(η)¡ϕ(v(µ)¡v(η)). In either case, W(fµ,ηg)
is represented by the desired form.
Finally, we can show that the representation extends to entire domain. The argument
is similar that used in the conclusion of the proof [8, Thm 1]. Brieﬂy, by GP [8, Lemma 2],
Set-Betweenness implies that the representation extends to all ﬁnite menus. Then, given
that the set of ﬁnite menus is dense in Z in the Hausdorﬀ topology, the continuity of the
representation permits the representation to extend to all menus. For a more detailed
argument, see Lemmas 5 and 6 in the proof of Theorem 1.
C Appendix: Proof of Corollary 1
Let (u,v,ϕ) be a representation constructed as in the proof of Theorem 3. If % satisﬁes
Self-Control Linearity, we can show a counterpart of Lemma 14 (ii) as follows. A proof is
omitted.
Lemma 20 ϕ : A ! [0,1] satisﬁes ϕ(αw + (1 ¡ α)w0) = αϕ(w) + (1 ¡ α)ϕ(w0) for all
α 2 [0,1].
Since ϕ(0) = 0, we have ϕ(λw) = ϕ(λw + (1 ¡ λ)0) = λϕ(w) for all w 2 [0,w] and
λ 2 [0,1]. Thus, ϕ is linear function on [0,w]. Deﬁne K ´
ϕ(w)











Moreover, by (18), ϕ(w) = Kw for all w 2 (w,1]. That is, ϕ is written as a linear function
with a positive slope K. Redeﬁne v as Kv. Then, (u,v) is a GP representation.
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